An official report by Greek experts into the 2023 Tempi train collision has confirmed concerns that an “unknown” substance may have contributed to a massive explosion and the loss of 57 lives.
https://www.kathimerini.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/EODASAAM_Accident_Investigation_Tempi-1.pdf
The head of Greece’s National Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Organization (EODASAAM) Christos Papadimitriou also praised the families of the victims who took on the “titanic task” of investigating the scene of the accident by commissioning private experts.
The report also states that it was "unlikely" that the Larisa station master deliberately routed the two trains onto the same track but does not rule out intention.
Breaking a pattern, the station master decided to set the switches manually on the fateful night.
Despite having nearly caused a crash earlier, which was prevented on time by a train driver, he failed to notice for about ten minutes that he had routed the two trains onto the same track.
A control panel beside his desk alerted him to his mistake with a switch with the number 118 but the station master was especially overworked that night (which makes his decision to set the switches manually more strange)
Consider the likelihood of a collision occuring and when one of the trains has an illegal cargo of flammable liquid just behind the locomotive.
The report criticizes the failure to collect the vital evidence and even cover it up.
From media
An expert report into the 2023 Tempi train disaster just a day before its second anniversary, confirmed concerns that an “unknown” substance may have contributed to a massive explosion and the loss of life when two trains smashed into each other in central Greece, killing 57 passengers and crew.
The report by Greece’s National Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Organization (EODASAAM) also confirmed concerns that interventions made at the scene of the accident compromised the discovery of “vital information” and hampered investigations into the crash, which involved a freight train traveling south from Thessaloniki to Athens plowing head-on into a passenger train coming in the opposite direction.
The Railway Branch of EODASAAM is the independent National Investigating Body for Greece. It is responsible for investigating accidents and incidents on the national rail network.
Based on the observations that could be made, there is no indication that the technical equipment of the rolling stock that was used, gave rise to the formation and expansion of the enormous fireball that arose after the impact, and subsequently resulted in the secondary fires. With the existing evidence [it] is impossible to determine what exactly caused it, but simulations and expert reports indicate the possible presence of a hitherto unknown fuel,” the report says.
The 160-page report suggests that hardcore which was laid down over the debris may have extinguished traces of liquids and materials that contributed to the blast, which is believed to have cost the lives of between five and seven of the 57 victims, with the rest being killed by the impact of the two trains.
https://greekreporter.com/2025/02/27/tempi-train-disaster-expert-findings-possible-flammable-substance/
Excerpts on the control panel here
https://www.kathimerini.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/EODASAAM_Accident_Investigation_Tempi-1.pdf
The station master did not use the automated method to set the route for train IC-62 to leave Larissa station to
the north, towards Neoi Poroi, which would have positioned all switches correctly. Instead, he commanded the
individual switches manually and, while doing so, forgot to place the switches 118 A/B in the “main” position,
herewith guiding train IC-62 towards the opposite direction of normal travel. This mistake went further unnoticed
by the station master.
7 These actions and decisions of the station master need to be understood in the difficult operational context he
was confronted with that night. Given the available evidence, it is very unlikely that the station master had the
intention to put train IC-62 on the opposite track. The control panel he had to use to remotely operate the switches
maybe easy to operate by more experienced station masters but can certainly lead to confusion when this
experience has not yet been sufficiently acquired. This was certainly the case for the station master on duty that
evening as the control panel contained relevant information in different places, different ways of operating
switches were used interchangeably, and clearly written instructions were not available.
8 Moreover, his normal workload was severely strained by a series of aggravating factors.
....
Within the Larissa station there is a signaling system which is controlled through a Control Panel placed in the
station master’s office. On the control panel the layout of the lines and switches are shown in a schematic form.
It also depicts the indications of the light signals for the station, the position and locking status of the switches,
the possible alignment of a route and the presence and position of the trains as soon as their first axle enters the
track circuits.
....
On 01/03/2023, around 6:30 to 7:00 in the morning after the accident, the technical experts appointed by the
judicial investigation went to the Larissa station, where they inspected the control panel and the infrastructure
components to determine the correct operation of the control panel and the response of switches 118 to the
operations of the control panel. They concluded that there was no indication of any malfunctioning.
,,,
The route for the train IC-62 to move from Larissa station to station Neoi Poroi has been manually undertaken,
and not via a more automated procedure. This violation of an existing procedure falls into a category called
“routine violation”, being a potential source of confusion while experience is growing. To put it in the context of
the traffic control room, as analysed in more in-depth through the next points, this more automated procedure -
although considered mandatory- was/is not the-single-way-of-doing-the-job. Instead, the manual manipulation
of switches was/is still needed and commonly used every day, by every station master, as observed on-site and
discussed during several interviews, including with supervisors and management.
...
The Larissa station master set the route for IC-62 to move to the north in a manual way, turning the related keys
on the control panel for this purpose. This manual operation was recognised as more complex and several
instructions were issued (198), so that it was expected for this specific route to be set automatically.
202 As was found when analysing the recordings of manipulations on the control panels for the four previous nights
(i.e. 24 to 27 February), the same station master had used the automated way of setting the route for train IC-62
all previous nights. Using the manual way of setting the route for IC-62 on the evening of the 28 was a break in
this pattern. These records, however, when looking at the overall picture of how the routes were set for different
trains, also clearly indicate that both ways of setting the route, manually and automated, were used
interchangeably by this station master.
...
When manually setting the route for the entry of train 2597, the station master of Larissa forgot to turn the
switches 116 and 115B in the correct position. On other occasions these switches would have been in the right
position after the entry and acceptance of train 2575 from Volos on track 3. Earlier in the evening, on the 28/02
this train 2575 was positioned on track 6 at 22:10 by the station master of the afternoon shift because track 3 was
occupied with train 2594 that had been brought back to the station at 21:30 after traction problems arose on its
way to Neoi Poroi (93).
224 This error was detected by the train driver of train 2597, who stopped the train in front of the switches and
contacted the station master of Larissa to understand the situation. After having realised his error, the station
master instructed the train driver of train 2597 to go back to free the section so that he could put switches 116
and 115B in the correct position. This activity required the full attention of the station master of Larissa between
22:35 and 22:41. Train 2597 finally arrived at a standstill on the dead-end track in the station of Larissa at 22:48.
...
possible way to prevent the departure of train IC-62 from the descending (wrong) track was for the station
master to recognise his own error in time, and intervene to position the switches 118 correctly and/or instruct the
train drivers to stop.
236 On the upper part of the control panel, there are three-position keys that are numbered according to the
electrically driven switch they handle. These keys are used for the independent, manual control of any electrically
driven switch. Turning the key from the central position by 90 degrees counterclockwise will command the
switches to move to the "main" position (indication "K"). Similarly, by turning the key 90 degrees with the clock,
the switches are commanded to move to the "bypass" (indicator "Π") position. When there is a correspondence
between the physical position of the switches and their control key, the yellow light diode for the indicated
position of the switches is lit steadily. Above the key of each switch, there is also a red light diode, in the central
position marked "A". This is the position the key should be put in to allows for “automatically setting” the routes.
https://www.kathimerini.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/EODASAAM_Accident_Investigation_Tempi-1.pdf
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